# AT: T Substantial

#### We meet – we’re an increase of 30% - CX checks

#### We’re a much larger increase – the US doesn’t have any power purchasing agreements for SMRs now

#### Counterinterpretation – Substantial means overt

Words & Phrases ‘64

(40 W&P 759)

The words outward, open, actual, visible, substantial, and exclusive, in connection with a change of possession, mean substantially the same thing. They mean not concealed; not hidden; exposed to view; free from concealment, dissimulation, reserve, or disguise; in full existence; denoting that which not merely can be, but is opposed to potential, apparent, constructive, and imaginary; veritable; genuine; certain; absolute; real at present time, as a matter of fact, not merely nominal; opposed to form; actually existing; true; not including, admitting, or pertaining to any others; undivided; sole; opposed to inclusive.

#### Substantial Means “Large”

**O**xford **E**nglish **D**ictionary, 2nd Ed, **1989**

[substantial:] Of ample or considerable amount, quantity, or dimensions. More recently also in a somewhat weakened sense, esp. ‘fairly large.’

#### Standards –

#### Aff ground – specification is arbitrary and leads to losing on the 1% less PIC every round – destroys fairness

#### Predictability – substantial violations should be determined by literature – key to the aff knowing they’re topical before the round

####  Reasonability – good is good enough – their arbitrary

# AT: Prolif Good

#### None of their evidence is specific to the Middle East – no survivability, historic tensions, and short flight times make war uniquely likely – that’s Edelman and **Krepinevich and Russell**

#### New nuclear states cause war – that’s Horowitz – inexperience, military control, and foreign perception mean transitions increase instability and conflict – prefer evidence that doesn’t look at proliferation in a vacuum

#### Each state with weapons increases the risk – that’s Below – prolif increases tension and creates pressures for arms racing

#### Prolif optimists rely on theorizing over data – models are insufficient for policymaking

Busch, Professor of Government at Christopher Newport University, ‘4 (Nathan, “No End in Sight: The Continuing Menace of Nuclear Proliferation” p 281-314)

Until now, the proliferation debate has largely taken place on an abstract, theoretical level. No doubt this orientation partly reflects perfectly legitimate scholarly concerns: in order to improve our understanding of international affairs, we of course need to establish theories to explain and predict state action. Participants in the proliferation debate have gone astray, however, in placing theorizing at the beginning, rather than at the end of their thinking. Instead of building theories on solid evidence gathered from rigorous empirical studies, they have too often predicted future state actions only on the basis of preexisting theories. From a scholarly point of view, one of the most important lessons from the present study is that we cannot afford anything other than a relentlessly empirical foundation for—and testing of— social science theory.

While abstract theorizing can be found on both sides of the debate, it is especially common among the optimists. Rather than asking how NWSs actually do act, optimists have begun with theories of how states should act—that is, in accordance with supposedly "realist" rational-actor models—and predicted the actions of states on that basis. One need only recall Waltz's confident statement, "We do not have to wonder whether they [NWSs] will take good care of their weapons. They have every incentive to do so.""" On the contrary, the proper approach to theory would begin with wonder about whether states do, in fact, always act with such rational incentives in mind. As the present study has demonstrated, there is little empirical support for such an optimistic position where nuclear proliferation is concerned. While realist theories may be useful for explaining certain types of state actions, they are inappropriate models for predicting specific policies and actions that NWSs will take.

Having oversimplified the causes and motivations of state action, the optimists make highly inappropriate policy recommendations regarding nuclear proliferation. Indeed, those recommendations go beyond what the optimists' own theories could possibly support. In a context other than the proliferation debate, Waltz argues that his theories cannot predict specific policies or particular actions by individual states; instead, he maintains, they can predict only general trends.1" But, as Jeffrey Knopf has pointed out, when one is advocating a further proliferation of nuclear weapons, predicting general trends is not enough: one must be certain that one's theories are correct all of the time. It is likely that a certain awareness of the special dangers attending nuclear weapons policy leads Waltz to misapply his own realist theory and predict that NWSs will act rationally without exception. But that awareness must be replaced by fully conscious practical reasoning. Empirically grounded theories, combined with the prudence of the policymaker, would lead to policy recommendations that are more sound.

Absent a nuclear exchange, or a series of nuclear exchanges, we will lack conclusive proof that a further spread of nuclear weapons will lead to nuclear catastrophes. May such a proof never be forthcoming. In the meantime, however, I hope this study will contribute to more nuanced and accurate theorizing about state action—theories acknowledging that while states sometimes act rationally, they often fail to do so when constrained by certain political, bureaucratic, economic, and other factors. I also hope this study will contribute to better-informed policymaking on nuclear issues. Although continued study of the historical record and future developments will surely provide additional relevant information, it is already fairly clear that U.S. and global interests lie in preventing a further spread of nuclear weapons and reducing nuclear dangers among current NWSs as much as possible. If the United States takes the lead in these areas, we will make progress toward making the world a safer place.

#### Prolif makes preemption likely – state uncertainty

Jeffrey W. Knopf, Professor in the Department of National Security Affairs at the Naval Postgraduate School, October 2002, “Recasting the proliferation optimism-pessimism debate,” Security Studies, Vol. 12, No. 1, p. 60-61

The second implication of pressures to seek damage limitation is therefore that optimists are too quick to dismiss the possibility of preemption. Optimists argue that states will never attempt a first strike because they can never be certain of achieving 100 percent success, and the possibility of retaliation with even a few nuclear weapons makes preemption too great a risk.54 As long as state leaders value the survival of their society,55 this is certainly true for any premeditated “bolt from the blue.” If one believes, however, that an attack by the other side is about to take place, then one might not require a guarantee of a perfect first strike, but merely a reasonable chance that one can destroy enough of the other side’s forces to make a meaningful difference in the damage one suffers.

Waltz simply does not get this point. In the revised version of the debate book, he writes: “The initial advantage [of striking first] is insignificant if the cost of gaining it is half a dozen cities.”56 If leaders believe, however, that the choice has boiled down to losing six cities or losing twelve, they may see a first strike as a way to save six cities. If prospect theory—which suggests that people are especially willing to gamble to try to reduce what appear to be certain losses—is correct, the chances of such a choice are even greater than RDT would anticipate.57

This reveals the problem with phrasing the second requirement for deterrence stability as the existence of second-strike capabilities. Secure secondstrike forces add greatly to crisis stability, but they are not sufficient to ensure that there are no deliberate decisions to launch first. In circumstances where there are growing doubts about whether nuclear deterrence will continue to hold, damage-limitation pressures could potentially lead to an intentional decision to preempt even with an expectation that the opponent will have some forces that could survive and strike second.

#### Prolif increases tension that results in escalation – changed perceptions of motivation and posturing

Jeffrey W. Knopf, Professor in the Department of National Security Affairs at the Naval Postgraduate School, October 2002, “Recasting the proliferation optimism-pessimism debate,” Security Studies, Vol. 12, No. 1, p. 57-58

Nuclear weapons can exacerbate tensions in two ways: by creating an increased perception of threat and by prompting efforts to limit damage in the event of nuclear war. On the first point, proliferation optimists write as if potential adversaries exist at a given, fixed level of hostility. This is unlikely to be the case. Rather, a state that acquires nuclear weapons is likely to be perceived as more threatening than it was before. This will be partly because of the new, more destructive capabilities at its disposal. In some cases, however, a state’s pursuit of nuclear weapons may also change how other states view its intentions.

This is especially likely because new and aspiring nuclear states are not always circumspect in their pronouncements. In March 1994, in the midst of a crisis over North Korea’s suspected nuclear weapons program, the North’s chief negotiator threatened his South Korean counterpart that a war could break out in which the South would be turned into “a sea of fire.”47 After the May 1998 nuclear tests in India, Prime Minister Vajpayee wrote President Clinton and explicitly cited a threat from China as a motivation for the tests. Statements by Defense Minister Fernandes shortly before and again shortly after the tests also described China as “potential threat number one” to India.48 Other Indian officials publicly warned Pakistan to end its support for separatist insurgents in Kashmir. Home Minister Advani called on Islamabad to “realize the change in the geostrategic situation” and said that in the new circumstances even the option of “hot pursuit” would not be ruled out.49 Such statements are bound to be provocative to the states against which they are directed. States on the receiving end of new, public nuclear threats will likely feel a need to display their toughness as a way to show they will not be intimidated. While nuclear weapons do encourage caution, they can also create pressures to demonstrate resolve, and any such demonstration carries with it some risk of escalation.

# AT: Obama Good Elections

#### Case outweighs –

#### Prolif multiplies the risk of war – that’s Below – magnitude is higher when there’s potential for nuclear escalation

#### Cyber-attacks are immediate – China will invade Taiwan while the grid is shut down – that’s Gorman and Barnes – US would retaliate in the short term

#### N/U – foreign policy crises will tank Obama

Morrissey, 9/18 (Ed, 9/18/2012, “Will this become a foreign-policy election?” <http://hotair.com/archives/2012/09/18/will-this-become-a-foreign-policy-election/> )

We’ve assumed throughout this election cycle that the economy and jobs would drive voter choice, but that would mean a referendum on the current incumbent, something Democrats desperately wanted to avoid. Two weeks ago, Democrats promised us that they would make foreign policy the focus of the election. As I note in my column for The Week, that didn’t come from low-level party functionaries, but from the prime-time speakers — including Barack Obama himself:

 Ironically, Democrats had promised a fight on foreign policy just a week earlier, at their national convention. Sen. John Kerry, the party’s nominee in 2004, called the Republican ticket “the most inexperienced foreign-policy twosome to run for president and vice president in decades.” Barack Obama himself attacked Mitt Romney and Paul Ryan as “new to foreign policy,” and warned that “they want to take us back to an era of blustering and blundering that cost America so dearly.” Democrats salivated at the prospect of highlighting Obama’s foreign-policy experience — all of which he compiled over the last three-and-a-half years — as a contrast to the GOP’s nominees, and a transparent attempt to deflect the election away from the economy.

As an old axiom warns, be careful what you wish for — you just might get it. With the explosion of violent protests in the Muslim world and the first US Ambassador killed in the line of duty since 1979, foreign policy has finally intruded in a big way in this election — and it doesn’t make Obama look good at all. When the Washington Post’s liberal columnist Richard Cohen rips a Democratic President for a feckless foreign policy, it’s a stark indicator of just how badly Obama has failed on this front:

 What lessons can be learned from events in Libya? That nothing good will come out of the Arab Spring? That Arabs are volatile, easily excitable and prone to acting out? That the United States, Mitt Romney notwithstanding, cannot control everything or that the United States, Mitt Romney more to the point, has tried to control nothing? In other words, is this what happens when the United States is “leading from behind”?

 This phrase, you might remember, was coined in reference to Barack Obama’s reluctance to take the lead in the NATO air campaign that toppled the dictatorship of Moammar Gaddafi. And that operation, in which the French seized the initiative, was mounted to save Benghazi, the city where the insurrection started and the one where U.S. Ambassador J. Christopher Stevens and three other Americans were killed last week. Benghazi was saved from Gaddafi’s bloody reprisals, but not from mayhem.

 The notion that the United States can lead from behind is pitiful, the sorry concoction of an Obama administration that mistakes dulcet passivity for a foreign policy. The view from behind now has to be awfully depressing. Where once Obama could see the gallant tails of the French, the British, the Italians and some others, there is now no one. The predictably indignant Nicolas Sarkozy has been replaced by the soullessly pragmatic Francois Hollande, who has other fish to saute. NATO’s warplanes have returned to base and Libya, a tribal society, was left to fend for itself. It has not fended all that well.

Cohen predictably rips Romney for pointing this out, but concludes that Romney is very much right about Obama’s foreign policy of passivity:

 Romney was wrong and ham-fisted and alarmingly premature to criticize Obama for a statement put out by the U.S. Embassy in Cairo. He is both wrong and dishonest to keep repeating the canard about Obama being a serial apologizer. But he is right in sensing that beyond the very Obamaness of Obama himself — the quality that made him a Nobel Peace Prize winner in the pupal stage of his presidency — lurks a foreign policy that has been more sentiment and aspiration than hard reasoning. Leading from behind is not a nifty phrase. In Libya, it’s an indictment.

Michael Ramirez distills the lessons from a week of making the Obama foreign-policy expertise the center of attention:

But will this become a foreign-policy election? In my column, I argue no — at least not for now — but that it might end up backfiring on Obama anyway:

 By Monday, the Washington Post reported that the Obama campaign would shift its focus to the economy, a stark about-face from just a fortnight earlier in Charlotte, N.C.

 Have events changed the nature of the election from a focus primarily on domestic policy to a debate on Obama’s handling of foreign policy? If more revelations of incompetence arise, perhaps — but at this point, that seems doubtful. When crises do erupt, they tend to take a long time to damage presidents; Jimmy Carter’s polling looked solid in September 1980, despite 10 months of a hostage crisis in Iran that echoes in today’s multiple diplomatic crises. Although foreign policy is the one area in which presidents have most authority, voters tend to grade incumbents on whether they have improved their economic situation. Voters want to know who lost the economic recovery more than they want to discuss who lost Egypt, because that has a lot more relevance to their immediate circumstances. But if the bungling continues at the White House and State Department, the risk rises that a perception of incompetence in the administration’s foreign policy will reinforce an impression of incompetence in economic policy, and create the kind of narrative that made Carter a one-term president.

In short, the argument for an economy-based election always relied on making an argument that Barack Obama has performed incompetently. These episodes reinforce the sense of incompetence and broaden it to an area that Democrats figured would be a strength for Obama in this election. That may provide a hinge that could spell doom for Obama in the election, especially if further data shows that the White House and State missed opportunities to prevent what happened in Benghazi.

#### Romney will win --- best unskewed data proves

Chambers, 9/18 (Dean, 9/18/2012, “Mitt Romney vs. Barack Obama: An unskewed look at the latest polls,” <http://www.examiner.com/article/mitt-romney-vs-barack-obama-an-unskewed-look-at-the-latest-polls>)

There are exactly seven weeks left today before election day in November. As we get close to that day, the polls for the presidential race get increasingly more attention. The Rasmussen Reports Daily Presidential Tracking Poll released today shows Mitt Romney leading over President Obama by a 47 percent to 45 percent margin. That same poll also shows Obama's approval rating at 49 percent and his disapproval rating to be 50 percent. Even the skewed Gallup tracking poll, reported today, shows Obama leading by only one percent, at 47 percent to 46 percent for Romney.

The UnSkewed Average of polls released today shows a Mitt Romney lead over Barack Obama of 51.5 percent to 43.7 percent. The UnSkewed average of polls includes the unskewed data from several mainstream media and other major polls of the presidential race along with the QStarNews presidential poll. Here is an example illustrating the process of “unskewing” a skewed poll that over-sampled Democrats.

New Jersey-based Monmouth University released a new poll of the presidential race yesterday showing President Obama leading 48 percent to 41 percent among registered voters and 48 percent to 45 percent over Mitt Romney among likely voters. Unskewing this poll leads to a result showing Romney leading with a 46 percent to 45 percent margin over President Obama with registered voters, and likewise a 50 percent to 45 perfect Romney lead among likely voters.

The QStarNews Quick Poll of the presidential race released yesterday shows Mitt Romney with a solid 11 point lead, 55 percent to 44 percent, over President Obama. The poll, the first conducted by QStarNews, was a web-based survey that included 2075 respondents and a margin of error of three percent. The respondents participated in the survey between September 10-15. Additionally, the survey found 55 percent disapproving of the performance of President Obama while 45 percent approved of the president's job in office.

The latest New York Times/CBS News poll of the presidential race released recently is yet another doctored poll that shows President Obama leading when its data indicates a Mitt Romney lead. The survey of 1170 registered voters, polled between September 8-12, has Obama leading over Romney by a 49 percent to 46 percent margin. Unskewing the data indicates a Romney lead over Obama by 51 percent to 44 percent.

The new Democracy Corps survey of the presidential race released recently shows President Obama leading by a 50 percent to 45 percent lead over Mitt Romney. Additionally, the poll shows Obama with a 49 percent approval rating and a 48 percent disapproval rating. The survey of 1000 likely voters, reported today and conducted between September 8-12, includes 41 percent Democrats, 30 percent Republicans and 28 percent independent voters. This is a heavy over-sampling of Democrats by 13 percent in the sample used for in this Democracy Corps poll. When the data from this poll is unskewed, the results calculate to Romney leading Obama by a 52 percent to 43 percent with about five percent undecided.

The Fox News poll released today continues the trend of skewed polls that over-sample Democratic voters to produce results favorable to the president. The poll reports President Obama leading over Mitt Romney by a margin of 48 percent to 43 percent. But this is based on a sample that includes eight percent more Democrats than it does Republicans for an electorate that is made up of two percent more Republicans than Democrats. Unskewing of this poll's data leads to Romney leading Obama by a 48 percent to 45 percent with about seven percent undecided.

More so than past election cycles the national polls, especially those conducted by mainstream media outlets, have heavily over-sampled Democrats on the assumptions of higher than likely Democratic voter turnout, and in turn have shown results heavily skewed toward the Democrats. The unskewing method of analysis of these polls used here in this column is simply a way balancing the data from these polls, gathered by the pollsters that conducted them, and weighting them to reflect the actual makeup of the electorate in the interest of producing the most accurate measures of public opinion.

The current UnSkewed Average of Polls reported today by UnSkewedPolls.com shows Mitt Romney leading by 7.8 percent over President Romney. That average indicates that a popular vote victory for Mitt Romney by a 53 percent to 45 percent margin over Barack Obama is likely if the election were held today. That differs greatly with the Real Clear Politics average of polls that shows a 2.9 percent Barack Obama lead. This is because at least nine of the 11 polls included in the average are heavily skewed polls conducted by mainstream media outlets that massively over-sample Democratic voters to produce results more favorable to President Obama. Most of those same polls, in unskewed form, are included in the UnSkewed Average of Polls.

#### No link – Obama avoids crises

Rogers, 9/17 (Ed, 9/17/2012, “Obama's 21st-century Teflon is working,” <http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/the-insiders/post/obamas-21st-century-teflon-is-working/2012/09/17/82b05da8-00bf-11e2-bbf0-e33b4ee2f0e8_blog.html?wprss=rss_opinions> )

It is safe to say that America's outreach to the world under President Obama has been a complete failure. Does America enjoy more or less respect than it did four years ago? If you think more, please let me know where.

Last weekend was the end of Obama's foreign policy. Diplomats are being called in and troops are being sent out — at least to where our enemies will allow them. The likes of Sudan know they can refuse Obama's wish for more troops to protect our embassies. Obama will probably tell us the Sudanese promise to provide adequate protection for Americans was a hard-fought concession.

Anyway, for the first time since the 2012 campaign began, Obama might want to talk about the economy. The images of the fires burning and the angry crowds on the Arab streets all underscore the complete failure of Obama's foreign policy, reminding us of his naivete and the price we pay for his on-the-job-training. Remember, this is a man who thought he was worthy of the Nobel Peace Prize just for being who he was.

The planet would heal because of his desire for it to do so. His very presence meant tension in the Middle East would subside. And why not? He had some new ideas: Remember his instructions to his NASA administrator that there was no higher priority than to make Arabs feel better about themselves?

With the world mostly either disrespecting America or just sadly shaking its head and wondering where America has gone, perhaps the Obama campaign could use a few days of blaming George W. Bush for the Obama administration's economic failures.

Foreign policy can't win elections, but it can lose them. Obama is pushing his luck as it becomes more and more clear that he can't influence events that endanger America and American interests. Meanwhile, he has outsourced America's economic management to the Federal Reserve, an abdication of responsibility that will be the subject of books to come. By announcing another quantitative easing program, the Federal Reserve was irrefutably saying that Obama's policies are not working, that the economy is so weak it has to step in to do something to try and generate the jobs that Obama's policies haven't — and won't — deliver.

So as the campaign heads for the debates, voters must be asking themselves what a vote for Obama is really about. It's not about peace and prosperity. It's not about respect abroad and certainty at home. There is nothing about Obama's tenure in office that voters should want more of. So why is he winning? I'm not sure, but based on his record at home and the sorry state of affairs his foreign policy has produced, the fact that he isn't cratering suggests a 21st-century coat of Teflon that makes Reagan's legendary resilience look small-time.

#### Approval ratings are nonsense

Cohn, 8/7 (Nate, 8/9/2012, “Will Undecided Voters Make This Election 1980-Redux? The Data Points to No,” <http://www.tnr.com/blog/electionate/105853/obama-romney-undecided-voters> )

Of course, Obama’s approval ratings are beneath 50 percent, which may mean that a majority of Americans are ready to send him packing. But his disapproval rating, which gets less attention, isn’t above 50 percent, either. And a majority of voters usually say they have a favorable opinion of Obama, unlike Romney. There’s no reason to put more stock in approval ratings than net-approval or favorability ratings; there’s a solid empirical relationship between all three data points and election outcomes. And once you take all these metrics into account, Obama’s position begins to look better. He possesses plausible routes to 50 percent (which might help explain Romney’s relentlessly negative strategy).

#### Military spending is immune to political backlash

Norris, Executive director of Sustainable Security program at Center for American Progress, 12

(7/31, Money Pit on the Potomac, www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2012/07/31/money\_pit\_on\_the\_potomac?page=0,0)

July was a tough month for the Pentagon. The Washington Post revealed that three U.S. special operations soldiers died in Mali when their vehicle plunged off a bridge with three Moroccan prostitutes in the vehicle at the time. The special inspector general for Iraq reconstruction issued one of his final reports on U.S. reconstruction efforts in that country and estimated that $6 billion to $8 billion of the $51 billion spent on reconstruction was likely wasted, embezzled, or misplaced. The inspector general's investigations have produced 90 indictments, 72 convictions, and $177 million in fines and other penalties, with the highest percentage of convictions coming against military officers and defense contractors. Worse still, this came not long after the bean counters at the Government Accountability Office had issued yet another damning report on the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter, finding that the cost estimate for developing the F-35 had jumped an additional $15 billion since 2010. The reaction from the political class was swift and decisive, but not in the way you would think. Republican standard-bearer Mitt Romney called for an additional $2.1 trillion in defense spending over the next decade and called for adding 100,000 additional active-duty military personnel -- even as the United States winds down wars in Iraq and Afghanistan. The ranking Democrat on the House Armed Services Committee, Adam Smith, made an impassioned plea supporting the Defense Department's foreign assistance programs. And much of Congress continues to react as if sequestration budget cuts -- a sword of Damocles that they themselves voted for -- would prove apocalyptic even though they only reduce Pentagon spending to 2006 levels. The Pentagon has become the federal bureaucracy's version of a perpetual motion machine. Despite the fact that the military budget has roughly doubled over the last decade and the United States spends more on defense than China, Britain, France, Japan, Russia, Saudi Arabia, Germany, India, and Brazil combined, most members of Congress continue to see a vote for more defense spending as the safest vote in town. And for good reason. But because voting for defense spending is a painless vote for members of Congress, more and more lobbyists and interest groups have pushed their activities under the broad umbrella of the Pentagon in order to find safe harbor. This has led to the Pentagon to take on more and more activities that have very little to do with traditional definitions of national security. Take breast cancer, for example. As the Post notes, the Pentagon has received more than $3.6 billion for cancer research over the last 20 years, despite the fact that no president has ever requested this funding and that breast cancer research has nothing to do with the Pentagon's traditional limited purview in health -- battlefield medicine. Iowa Sen. Tom Harkin once bragged to his constituents that he had been able to double spending on breast cancer research by putting the additional funds in the Pentagon's budget. Of course, since the Defense Department doesn't have much expertise in breast cancer research, it turns around and relies on agencies like the National Institutes of Health, where the money should have been put in the first place, to oversee its grants under these programs. But Congress is not solely to blame for the Pentagon's ever growing mandate. The Defense Department itself has become increasingly fixated on the idea of "expeditionary economics." In a nutshell, the concept is that small teams of military professionals well versed in economics will be deployed to assist in the reconstruction of war-torn and disaster-prone countries. Any post-conflict expert worth his or her salt agrees that getting economic life restarted after a conflict is vital. However, the idea of putting an institution that has become synonymous with billion-dollar cost overruns in charge of setting economic policy in postwar settings seems risible. Indeed, there is probably no agency in the world that has been more insulated from basic economic realities over the last decade than the Pentagon. But still, no other federal agency is willing to say that the emperor across the Potomac has no clothes. Let us remember that Pentagon-led projects in Iraq and Afghanistan have been flush with cash but rife with problems. Just this week, the special inspector general for Afghanistan reconstruction reported that about $400 million in large infrastructure projects in Afghanistan are badly behind schedule and unlikely to make a dent in the Taliban insurgency. And this only underscores the Pentagon's power to get what it wants. When every other agency fails, Congress threatens to reduce its budget. When the Defense Department fails or makes grievous mistakes, it is automatically assumed that it went astray because it did not have enough money. But both Congress and the Pentagon itself should recognize the fundamental long-term risk of turning America's military budget into a catchall for everything from breast cancer research to roving teams of economists in combat boots. Military officers are great at fighting and winning wars because that is what they are trained to do. It's bad enough that there are already more people in U.S. military bands than in the entire Foreign Service, but does the country really want to train fighting men and women to build swimming pools in Iraq? The more amorphous America makes the U.S. military's purpose as an institution, the more likely the Pentagon will turn into a giant, muddled marshmallow of bureaucratic excess. Back in the 1990s, Republicans routinely wrung their hands over the idea that "mission creep" was undermining the military. Those concerns seem to have been quietly set aside as both parties acquiesce in building a military that can't say no. With major budget battles brewing, don't be surprised when people try to slip everything from domestic road building to arts funding into the behemoth defense budget.

#### Strong public support for federal nuclear power incentives – no effect from Fukushima

WNA 12

(September, World Nuclear Association, US Nuclear Power Policy, www.world-nuclear.org/info/inf41\_US\_nuclear\_power\_policy.html)

Public opinion regarding nuclear power has generally been fairly positive, and has grown more so as people have had to think about security of energy supplies. Different polls show continuing increase in public opinion favourable to nuclear power in the USA. More than three times as many strongly support nuclear energy than strongly oppose it. Two-thirds of self-described environmentalists favour it. A May 2008 survey (N=2925) by Zogby International showed 67% of Americans favoured building new nuclear power plants, with 46% registering strong support; 23% were opposed. Asked which kind of power plant they would prefer if it were sited in their community, 43% said nuclear, 26% gas, 8% coal. Men (60%) were more than twice as likely as women (28%) to be supportive of a nuclear power plant. A March 2010 Bisconti-GfK Roper survey showed that strong public support for nuclear energy was being sustained, with 74% in favour of it11. In particular, 87% think nuclear will be important in meeting electricity needs in the years ahead, 87% support licence renewal for nuclear plants, 84% believe utilities should prepare to build more nuclear plants, 72% supported an active federal role in encouraging investment in "energy technology that reduces greenhouse gases", 82% agree that US nuclear plants are safe and secure, 77% would support adding a new reactor at the nearest nuclear plant, and 70% say that USA should definitely build more plants in the future. Only 10% of people said they strongly opposed the use of nuclear energy. In relation to recycling used nuclear fuel, 79% supported this (contra past US policy), and the figure rose to 85% if "a panel of independent experts" recommended it. Although 59% were confident that used reactor fuel could be stored safely at nuclear power plant sites, 81% expressed a strong desire for the federal government to move used nuclear fuel to centralised, secure storage facilities away from the plant sites until a permanent disposal facility is ready. Half of those surveyed considered themselves to be environmentalists. A February 2011 Bisconti-GfK Roper survey showed similar figures, and that 89% of Americans agree that all low-carbon energy sources – including nuclear, hydro and renewable energy – should be taken advantage of to generate electricity while limiting greenhouse gas emissions. Just 10% disagreed. Also some 84% of respondents said that they associate nuclear energy "a lot" or "a little" with reliable electricity; 79% associate nuclear energy with affordable electricity; 79% associate nuclear energy with economic growth and job creation; and 77% associate nuclear energy and clean air. A more general March 2010 Gallup poll (N=1014) on energy showed 62% in favour of using nuclear power, including 28% strongly so, and 33% against, the most favourable figures since Gallup began polling the question in 1994. However, only 51% of Democrat voters were in favour12. An early March 2011 Gallup poll just before the Fukushima accident showed 57% in favour and 38% against, and in March 2012 (N=1024) still 57% in favour with 40% against (men: 72%-27%, women 42%-51%). Regarding plant safety, the polls showed consistent 56-58% positive views over 2009-12, but men-women split similar. A survey conducted in September 2011 by Bisconti Research Inc. with GfK Roper showed that although support for nuclear power decreased following the Fukushima accident and compared with a year earlier (a survey carried out in March 2010 by Bisconti Research found 74% of Americans favoured nuclear power), 62% of the 1000 adults surveyed in the latest poll were supportive of utilizing nuclear power while 35% expressed opposition. The survey found that 82% of Americans believed that lessons had been learned from Fukushima and 67% of respondents considered US nuclear power plants safe (the same level as reported one month before the nuclear accident in Japan occurred). Also 85% of said that an extension of commercial operation should be granted to those plants that comply with federal safety standards, and 59% believed more nuclear power plants should definitely be built in the future, while 75% contend that “Electric utilities should prepare now so that new nuclear power plants could be built if needed in the next decade.” Finally, further expansion of the site of the nearest already operating nuclear power plant is supported by 67% and opposed by 28%.

#### No president can get anything done after the election

Dadush, et. al, 8/2---director of Carnegie’s International Economics Program (8/2/2012, Uri Dadush, Shimelse Ali --- economist in the International Economics Program, and Zaahira Wyne --- managing editor of Carnegie’s International Economic Bulletin, “What Does the U.S. Election Mean for the World Economy?” <http://carnegieendowment.org/2012/08/02/what-does-u.s.-election-mean-for-world-economy/d5mp> )

Few things are certain, especially given the threat to the U.S. economy posed by the crisis in Europe. But some pundits have already begun forecasting that Obama will beat Romney by a fair number of electoral votes despite a dead heat in the popular vote. The FiveThirtyEight blog in the New York Times, one of the few outlets venturing a forecast for toss-up states, projects 294 electoral votes for Obama versus 244 for Romney and a one-percentage-point win for Obama in the popular vote. The Washington Post’s The Fix blog offers a more cautious assessment, one that nonetheless shows Obama winning and closer to the decisive 270 mark. However, Republicans are expected to easily retain control of the House of Representatives and may also regain control of the Senate by a small margin.

Two crucial points emerge. First, even if Obama wins and Democrats retain the Senate, the president will have to seek a compromise with a Republican House. Second, in no scenario, including a Romney win, would either party gain a filibuster-proof 60 seats in the Senate. This means that the victorious candidate, whoever he is, would have to try to compromise with senators of the opposite party, not to mention members of his own party whose views may differ on a particular issue, in order to pass meaningful legislation.

It follows that the implications of the U.S. elections for the global economy depend less on precise electoral platforms than on the shape of the compromise reached on the big issues, and, against a background of fraying consensus, whether compromise can be reached at all. Thus, the U.S. electoral outcome is likely far less predictive of policy than, say, the Socialists’ sweep in France in May or even last year’s Conservative/Liberal Democrat victory in the UK.

#### Israel strike coming before the election

Goodman, 8/23 --- White House correspondent for The Canadian Press (8/23/2012, Lee-Ann, “Middle East politics may cast deciding vote in U.S. presidential race,” <http://thechronicleherald.ca/opinion/129164-middle-east-politics-may-cast-deciding-vote-in-us-presidential-race> )

I had lunch with Canada’s ambassador to the United States last week, and amid a discussion of bilateral issues, Gary Doer expressed more than a little surprise about the lack of attention being paid stateside to a major international story that could profoundly affect the U.S. presidential election.

Israel may be preparing to attack Iran — and the bombs could start dropping before the Nov. 6 vote.

Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu is reportedly determined to strike before Americans head to the polls, believing U.S. President Barack Obama would then have no choice but to back the Israeli military action. Alon Ben-David, Israel Channel 10’s well-connected military specialist, reported this week that Israel is “closer than ever” to launching an attack. Some Israeli pundits believe the decision to strike has already been made.

#### Water wars inevitable in the future – military deployment of SMRs only way to solve

Pfeffer, Scientist at Army Nuclear and Chemical Agency, ’01

[“Nuclear Power: An Option for the Army's Future,” http://www.almc.army.mil/alog/issues/SepOct01/MS684.htm]

For the military, a small nuclear power plant could fit on a barge and be deployed to a remote theater, where it could produce both hydrogen fuel and potable water for use by U.S. and coalition forces in time of conflict. In peacetime, these same portable plants could be deployed for humanitarian or disaster relief operations to generate electricity and to produce hydrogen fuel and potable water as necessary. Such dual usage (hydrogen fuel for equipment and potable water for human consumption) could help peacekeepers maintain a fragile peace. These dual roles make nuclear-generated products equally attractive to both industry and the military, and that could foster joint programs to develop modern nuclear power sources for use in the 21st century. So What's Next? The Army must plan for the time when carbon-based fuels are no longer the fuel of choice for military vehicles. In just a few years, oil and natural gas prices have increased by 30 to 50 percent, and, for the first time in years, the United States last year authorized the release of some of its oil reserves for commercial use. As the supply of oil decreases, its value as a resource for the plastics industry also will increase. The decreasing supply and increasing cost of carbon-based fuels eventually will make the hydrogen fuel and nuclear power combination a more attractive alternative. One proposed initiative would be for the Army to enter into a joint program with private industry to develop new engines that would use hydrogen fuel. In fact, private industry already is developing prototype automobiles with fuel cells that run on liquefied or compressed hydrogen or methane fuel. BMW has unveiled their hydrogen-powered 750hL sedan at the world's first robotically operated public hydrogen fueling station, located at the Munich, Germany, airport. This prototype vehicle does not have fuel cells; instead, it has a bivalent 5.4-liter, 12-cylinder engine and a 140-liter hydrogen tank and is capable of speeds up to 140 miles per hour and a range of up to 217.5 miles. Another proposed initiative would exploit previous Army experience in developing and using small, portable nuclear power plants for the future production of hydrogen and creation of a hydrogen fuel infrastructure. Based on recent advances in small nuclear power plant technology, it would be prudent to consider developing a prototype plant for possible military applications. The Army Nuclear Power Program The military considered the possibility of using nuclear power plants to generate alternate fuels almost 50 years ago and actively supported nuclear energy as a means of reducing logistics requirements for coal, oil, and gasoline. However, political, technical, and military considerations forced the closure of the program before a prototype could be built. The Army Corps of Engineers ran a Nuclear Power Program from 1952 until 1979, primarily to supply electric power in remote areas. Stationary nuclear reactors built at Fort Belvoir, Virginia, and Fort Greeley, Alaska, were operated successfully from the late 1950s to the early 1970s. Portable nuclear reactors also were operated at Sundance, Wyoming; Camp Century, Greenland; and McMurdo Sound in Antarctica. These small nuclear power plants provided electricity for remote military facilities and could be operated efficiently for long periods without refueling. The Army also considered using nuclear power plants overseas to provide uninterrupted power and defense support in the event that U.S. installations were cut off from their normal logistics supply lines. In November 1963, an Army study submitted to the Department of Defense (DOD) proposed employing a military compact reactor (MCR) as the power source for a nuclear-powered energy depot, which was being considered as a means of producing synthetic fuels in a combat zone for use in military vehicles. MCR studies, which had begun in 1955, grew out of the Transportation Corps' interest in using nuclear energy to power heavy, overland cargo haulers in remote areas. These studies investigated various reactor and vehicle concepts, including a small liquid-metal-cooled reactor, but ultimately the concept proved impractical. The energy depot, however, was an attempt to solve the logistics problem of supplying fuel to military vehicles on the battlefield. While nuclear power could not supply energy directly to individual vehicles, the MCR could provide power to manufacture, under field conditions, a synthetic fuel as a substitute for conventional carbon-based fuels. The nuclear power plant would be combined with a fuel production system to turn readily available elements such as hydrogen or nitrogen into fuel, which then could be used as a substitute for gasoline or diesel fuel in cars, trucks, and other vehicles. Of the fuels that could be produced from air and water, hydrogen and ammonia offer the best possibilities as substitutes for petroleum. By electrolysis or high- temperature heat, water can be broken down into hydrogen and oxygen and the hydrogen then used in engines or fuel cells. Alternatively, nitrogen can be produced through the liquefaction and fractional distillation of air and then combined with hydrogen to form ammonia as a fuel for internal-combustion engines. Consideration also was given to using nuclear reactors to generate electricity to charge batteries for electric-powered vehicles—a development contingent on the development of suitable battery technology. By 1966, the practicality of the energy depot remained in doubt because of questions about the cost-effectiveness of its current and projected technology. The Corps of Engineers concluded that, although feasible, the energy depot would require equipment that probably would not be available during the next decade. As a result, further development of the MCR and the energy depot was suspended until they became economically attractive and technologically possible. Other efforts to develop a nuclear power plant small enough for full mobility had been ongoing since 1956, including a gas-cooled reactor combined with a closed- cycle gas-turbine generator that would be transportable on semitrailers, railroad flatcars, or barges. The Atomic Energy Commission (AEC) supported these developments because they would contribute to the technology of both military and small commercial power plants. The AEC ultimately concluded that the probability of achieving the objectives of the Army Nuclear Power Program in a timely manner and at a reasonable cost was not high enough to justify continued funding of its portion of projects to develop small, stationary, and mobile reactors. Cutbacks in military funding for long-range research and development because of the Vietnam War led the AEC to phase out its support of the program in 1966. The costs of developing and producing compact nuclear power plants were simply so high that they could be justified only if the reactor had a unique capability and filled a clearly defined objective backed by DOD. After that, the Army's participation in nuclear power plant research and development efforts steadily declined and eventually stopped altogether. Nuclear Technology Today The idea of using nuclear power to produce synthetic fuels, originally proposed in 1963, remains feasible today and is gaining significant attention because of recent advances in fuel cell technology, hydrogen liquefaction, and storage. At the same time, nuclear power has become a significant part of the energy supply in more than 20 countries—providing energy security, reducing air pollution, and cutting greenhouse gas emissions. The performance of the world's nuclear power plants has improved steadily and is at an all-time high. Assuming that nuclear power experiences further technological development and increased public acceptance as a safe and efficient energy source, its use will continue to grow. Nuclear power possibly could provide district heating, industrial process heating, desalination of seawater, and marine transportation. Demand for cost-effective chemical fuels such as hydrogen and methanol is expected to grow rapidly. Fuel cell technology, which produces electricity from low-temperature oxidation of hydrogen and yields water as a byproduct, is receiving increasing attention. Cheap and abundant hydrogen eventually will replace carbon-based fuels in the transportation sector and eliminate oil's grip on our society. But hydrogen must be produced, since terrestrial supplies are extremely limited. Using nuclear power to produce hydrogen offers the potential for a limitless chemical fuel supply with near-zero greenhouse gas emissions. As the commercial transportation sector increasingly moves toward hydrogen fuel cells and other advanced engine concepts to replace the gasoline internal combustion engine, DOD eventually will adopt this technology for its tactical vehicles. The demand for desalination of seawater also is likely to grow as inadequate freshwater supplies become an urgent global concern. Potable water in the 21st century will be what oil was in the 20th century—a limited natural resource subject to intense international competition. In many areas of the world, rain is not always dependable and ground water supplies are limited, exhausted, or contaminated. Such areas are likely to experience conflict among water-needy peoples, possibly prompting the deployment of U.S. ground forces for humanitarian relief, peacekeeping, or armed intervention. A mobile desalination plant using waste heat from a nuclear reactor could help prevent conflicts or provide emergency supplies of freshwater to indigenous populations, and to U.S. deployed forces if necessary.

#### Global nuclear war

NASCA, ’04

[National Association for Scientific & Cultural Appreciation, “Water shortages - Only a matter of time,” http://www.nasca.org.uk/Strange\_relics\_/water/water.html]

Water is one of the prime essentials for life as we know it. The plain fact is - no water, no life! This becomes all the more worrying when we realise that the worlds supply of drinkable water will soon diminish quite rapidly. In fact a recent report commissioned by the United Nations has emphasised that by the year 2025 at least 66% of the worlds population will be without an adequate water supply. As a disaster in the making water shortage ranks in the top category. Without water we are finished, and it is thus imperative that we protect the mechanism through which we derive our supply of this life giving fluid. Unfortunately the exact opposite is the case. We are doing incalculable damage to the planets capacity to generate water and this will have far ranging consequences for the not too distant future. The United Nations has warned that burning of fossil fuels is the prime cause of water shortage. While there may be other reasons such as increased solar activity it is clear that this is a situation over which we can exert a great deal of control. If not then the future will be very bleak indeed! Already the warning signs are there. The last year has seen devastating heatwaves in many parts of the world including the USA where the state of Texas experienced its worst drought on record. Elsewhere in the United States forest fires raged out of control, while other regions of the globe experienced drought conditions that were even more severe. Parts of Iran, Afgahnistan, China and other neighbouring countries experienced their worst droughts on record. These conditions also extended throughout many parts of Africa and it is clear that if circumstances remain unchanged we are facing a disaster of epic proportions. Moreover it will be one for which there is no easy answer. The spectre of a world water shortage evokes a truly frightening scenario. In fact the United Nations warns that disputes over water will become the prime source of conflict in the not too distant future. Where these shortages become ever more acute it could forseeably lead to the brink of nuclear conflict. On a lesser scale water, and the price of it, will acquire an importance somewhat like the current value placed on oil. The difference of course is that while oil is not vital for life, water most certainly is!

# AT: Oil DA

#### No link – nuclear power doesn’t power cars – just houses – means no tradeoff with oil

#### Long-term link doesn’t affect the state of Russian oil prices – dependent on development of hydrogen cars

## .U

#### Oil price decline won’t end until 2013

Fontevecchia , writer @ Forbes, 6-5-12,

Agustino, “Remember How Oil Prices Threatened The Recovery? Look At Them Now,” <http://www.forbes.com/sites/afontevecchia/2012/06/05/remember-how-oil-prices-threatened-the-recovery-look-at-them-now/>

These latest, and dramatic, declines in prices are the consequence of traditional supply and demand dynamics. According to a report by the Energy Intelligence Group, picked up by Business Week, global oil consumption fell to 88.5 million barrels a day as of the end of April, from 90.4 million in late December. At the same time, supplies have been rising for more than a year. OPEC noted in its May report that “higher non-OPEC supply and rising OPEC production has resulted in total supply exceeding market needs.”¶ OPEC expects global oil demand to slow sequentially to 87.47 million barrels per day in the second quarter, then firming to 89.50 and 89.72 in the last two quarters of the year. Part of that increase is due to Japan shutting off its nuclear power reactors in the wake of the Fukushima accident.¶ Slowing global demand led Royal Dutch Shell’s CEO to argue prices haven’t found their floor yet, and probably won’t in 2012. Peter Voser, Shell CEO, said on Tuesday he expects a “softening of prices which […] could go well into the second half of this year,” according to Reuters. “Global demand is softening, we have got recessionary elements in Europe, a small slowdown in Asia Pacific,” explained the chief executive. With the U.S. clearly losing momentum, as evidenced by the latest jobs report, and China cooling, Voser doesn’t see crude oil demand picking up until 2013.¶ Voser also spoke of Iran, which had fueled much of the upside risk for oil early this year. “Some of the political elements of price volatility over the past few months have kind of receded,” he said. Geopolitical concerns seem to have moved to the background, as Iran has accepted to sit at the bargaining table, even if only to stall the negotiations.¶ Lower oil prices will put pressure on big oil’s bottom line. Companies like Exxon Mobil, Chevron, and BP took advantage of record high prices early this year, despite suffering from weak refining margins. On the other hand, increased production means activity will be higher for oilfield services companies like Halliburton and Schlumberger, meaning there could be opportunity in oil-related equities.¶ Upside risk does remain, though. Expectations are high for ECB chief Mario Draghi to announce additional easing on Wednesday, possibly including a new LTRO-liquidity injection. Analysts are also raising their probability estimates for another round of QE at the hands of Ben Bernanke and the Fed. Both of these would be, on the face of them supportive of global growth and could channel capital into commodities, including oil. Stimulus in China could also feed bullish forces.¶ For the moment, though, oil prices are stuck in a downward trend. With Iran-risk off the table for the time being, Europe collapsing, and the U.S. and China losing steam, it seems like crude should continue to drop until demand balances with supply. But, investors should remember how just a few months ago, prices were so high they threatened to cause a global recession. Things, in oil markets, move very quickly.

## AT: Link

#### Supply outweighs speculation in oil pricing

Wagner, economist @ Environmental defense fund, 2008,

September 26, Gernot, economist at the Environmental Defense Fund. Teaches energy economics as adjunct faculty at Columbia’s School of International and Public Affairs. Served on the editorial board of the Financial Times as a Peter Martin Fellow. Holds a bachelor’s in environmental science and a master’s and Ph.D. in political economy and government from Harvard, as well as a master’s in economics from Stanford. “Do demand and supply still drive oil prices?” <http://www.env-econ.net/2008/09/do-demand-and-s.html>

Much of that increase (if not all) was driven by simple economics. Led by the awesome rise of China's economy, many more people around the world suddenly started living - and consuming oil - like Americans. Demand went up, and supply hasn't been able to keep pace. Voilà, prices rise. In May, when oil hit $120 per barrel, public outcry over high prices reached the halls of Congress. Always on the lookout for easy solutions, some lawmakers searched for culprits and mistakenly thought they had found them in oil speculators. The speculation theory would have made sense had we also seen rising oil stockpiles - traders hoarding oil in the hope of selling it for a higher price later. That wasn't the case. Fortunately, legislation to curtail oil speculators never passed. Unfortunately, the uproar over high oil prices found another victim - the Lieberman-Warner cap-and-trade bill (remember that?) - due to the largely misplaced fear that climate legislation would drive up short-term oil prices even further. Fast forward to last week. Oil prices fell from their mid-summer highs to as low as $91. That fall was also caused by basic economics. This time, it was the fear of a global economic slowdown caused, in part, by high oil prices. It's Economics 101: Demand projections went down while supply remained steady, so prices fell. Then came this Monday. Fears of economic slowdown have been all around us, so demand projections, if anything, should point downward. Why would oil jump $25 before settling at a still-breathtaking increase of $16? This time, one factor might indeed have been speculation - or rather the lack thereof. The broader market jitters caused some traders to close up shop. Fewer trades mean greater price swings. Technicalities in the way oil is traded were likely another factor. The clock ran out on contracts for oil to be delivered in October, which led to the typical end-of-month price spike. Others cited "stupidity" or "manipulation" as reasons. But, as always, fundamentals played a role. This time, it was the supply side that was affected by hurricanes Ike and Gustav. The law of demand and supply is alive and well - phew, it's really the only law we've got. It also gives me a chance to plug the logical conclusion: The only real way to insulate our economy and pocketbooks from wide swings in the price of oil is to curb demand, ideally through a cap-and-trade system.

## Russia

### U- Russia Price Low

#### Russian oil prices low - New global oil reserves and high production costs

Mead 7/8 (Walter Russell, James Clarke Chace Professor of Foreign Affairs and Humanities at Bard College and Editor-at-Large of The American Interest magazine, “The Energy Revolution Part One: The Biggest Losers.” <http://blogs.the-american-interest.com/wrm/2012/07/08/the-energy-revolution-part-one-the-biggest-losers/>)

If the US, Canada and Israel are the likeliest big winners, the biggest losers in the coming shift will be the Gulf petro-states and Russia. Their Gulf losses aren’t going to be economic; the Gulf will still have the world’s cheapest oil to produce and so its oilfields will be the most profitable at any given price point.¶ ¶ Russia, on the other hand, is going to have a harder time. Its oil and gas are more expensive to produce and so Russia’s profit margins are likely to fall.¶ ¶ But regardless of the simple economic impact, in different ways and different degrees the Gulf countries and Russia are going to lose a lot of the political advantages that their energy wealth now gives them. They will have less ability to restrict supply and to manipulate prices than they have had in the past. Oil and gas are going to be less special when supplies are more abundant and more broadly distributed.

## Adventurism

###  Self Assurance

#### High oil prices cause Russian adventurism.

Mufson, Staff Writer @ The Washington Post, 2007

Steven, Staff Writer @ the Washington Post, Oil Price Rise Causes Global Shift in Wealth, November 10th http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2007/11/09/AR2007110902573\_pf.html

Russia, the world's No. 2 oil exporter, shows oil's transformational impact in the political as well as the economic realm. When Vladimir Putin came to power in 2000, less than two years after the collapse of the ruble and Russia's default on its international debt, the country's policymakers worried that 2003 could bring another financial crisis. The country's foreign-debt repayments were scheduled to peak at $17 billion that year.¶ Inside the Kremlin, with Putin nearing the end of his second and final term as president, that sum now looks like peanuts. Russia's gold and foreign-currency reserves have risen by more than that amount just since July. The soaring price of oil has helped Russia increase the federal budget tenfold since 1999 while paying off its foreign debt and building the third-largest gold and hard-currency reserves in the world, about $425 billion.¶ "The government is much stronger, much more self-assured and self-confident," said Vladimir Milov, head of the Institute of Energy Policy in Moscow and a former deputy minister of energy. "It believes it can cope with any economic crisis at home."¶ With good reason. Using energy revenue, the government has built up a $150 billion rainy-day account called the Stabilization Fund.¶ "This financial independence has contributed to more assertive actions by Russia in the international arena," Milov said. "There is a strong drive within part of the elite to show that we are off our knees."¶ The result: Russia is trying to reclaim former Soviet republics as part of its sphere of influence. Freed of the need to curry favor with foreign oil companies and Western bankers, Russia can resist what it views as American expansionism, particularly regarding NATO enlargement and U.S. missile defense in Eastern Europe, and forge an independent approach to contentious issues like Iran's nuclear program.

## Russia Economy- Link

### Laundry List

#### High oil prices hurt the Russian economy --- demand destruction, inflation, and market volatility

Hulbert, Senior Fellow @ Center for Security Studies, 2011

[Matthew, Senior fellow at the Center for Security Studies in Zurich, The Downside of High Oil Prices, February 2nd, http://www.themoscowtimes.com/opinion/article/the-downside-of-high-oil-prices/430204.html]

High prices might sound like good news for producers like Russia that want to replenish state coffers and boost political egos, but they carry two major risks. The first is potential demand destruction. The assumption in 2008 that demand was inelastic was a grave miscalculation. Most leading oil producers were lucky to survive. Whether $100 per barrel will break the bank again remains to be seen, but with anemic growth in the West and inflationary pressures in the East, it would be foolhardy to assume that anything higher than $100 per barrel would be positive for the global economy.¶ The second risk is that producers will rapidly lose control of the market if geopolitics starts dictating benchmark prices beyond fundamentals. Price hawks such as Iran, Algeria, Nigeria and Venezuela probably have no problem with that since they don’t have excess supply to put on the market anyway. But that’s not what Russia wants or needs right now. Market stability to increase upstream investment and arrest depletion rates should be the priority of the day, not adding more oil, so to speak, to the geopolitical fire.¶ It remains to be seen whether Saudi Arabia will agree to put more oil on the market or continue to appease price hawks by maximizing receipts. Price signals have been deafeningly silent so far — blaming speculation over fundamentals is the line coming out of Riyadh. No doubt that’s partially true, but that’s the point. Speculators like nothing more than the risk of geopolitical calamity to make a killing. Egypt has sent a clear signal to producers — quell the market now, or it will politically emasculate you later.¶ The last thing Moscow needs is heightened market volatility. The priority should be to stabilize the market, attract consistent upstream investment and arrest depletion to keep production above 10 million bpd. Russia should take note: Take the politics out of oil, or it will surely take its vengeance out on you.

### Interest Rates

#### Fuel inflation creates unsustainable Russian spending at the expense of reforms

Ulatov et al., Economists, 2011

(Sergei (Economist), Karlis Smits (Economist), Olga Emelyanova (Research Analyst), and Victor Sulla (Economist), under the direction of Zeljko Bogetic (Lead Economist and Country Sector Coordinator for economic policy for Russia and the general editor of the report). Lucio Vinhas da Souza (Senior Economist) and Shane Streifel (Consultant) contributed on the international environment and the global oil market. Karlis Smits (Economist) prepared the note on public expenditures. Sylvia Bossoutrot (Sr. Operations Ofﬁ cer and Country Coordinator for Private Sector and Finance for Russia) and Lawrence Kay (consultant), Sustaining Reforms under the Oil Windfall, Russian Economic Report, Number 24, March 2011)

Fiscal policy – return of the “oil curse?”¶ The ﬁscal outcome for 2010 was better than expected, but there is no room for complacency: this outcome was mainly due to high oil prices. According to preliminary estimates ¶ from the Ministry of Finance, the federal budget was executed with a deﬁcit of 4.1 percent of ¶ GDP, down from the actual 5.9 percent of GDP in 2009, and lower than the budgeted 2010 ¶ deﬁ cit of 5.3 percent. The lower deﬁ cit was mainly due higher revenues from oil: federal ¶ budget revenues amounted to 18.7 percent of GDP, compared to 17.4 percent stipulated in ¶ the 2010 Budget Law. The expenditures have been executed as planned in the Budget Law–at ¶ 22.7 percent of GDP, a 2 percent reduction in spending relative to 2009 level. But the non-oil ¶ ﬁ scal deﬁ cit remained at a very high level of 12.7 percent (13.5 percent in 2009), indicating ¶ high vulnerability of the budget to a sudden drop in oil prices. This scenario is something ¶ that the Russian economy has experienced repeatedly in recent decades, and it should not be ¶ discounted in the current environment of high oil prices.¶ Going forward, the government is implementing a program of gradual ﬁ scal adjustment, which aims to reduce the deﬁ cit from 4.1 percent of GDP in 2010 to less than 2 percent in 2011, according to recent policy statements. This revised target implies, however, ¶ that the oil price will remain above US$100 per barrel compared to US$75 per barrel, as ¶ stipulated in the 2010 Budget Law. There are two opposing short-term risks to this plan, each ¶ resulting in a higher-than-anticipated ﬁ scal deﬁ cit and a danger of delay in ﬁ scal adjustment. ¶ First, higher oil prices might encourage greater public spending in the preelection period at ¶ the end of 2011 and in 2012 (and could also fuel inﬂ ation). Relatedly, under that scenario, ¶ measures aimed at improving public expenditure effectiveness could be pushed off the priority agenda. Second, a fall in oil prices could threaten the revenues needed to attain ﬁ scal ¶ targets. ¶ But although the balance of risks of oil prices has shifted upwards, Russia’s budget ¶ remains vulnerable to a sudden drop in prices and a rise in expenditures. If, for example, ¶ starting from the baseline 2011 budget, oil prices fall to US$60 per barrel (close to the longterm historical average) for a period of about a year, the deﬁ cit in 2011 could increase well ¶ above 5 percent of GDP, raising the issue of ﬁ nancing such a large deﬁ cit.¶ The balance of the government’s reserve fund fell below 2 percent of GDP by endFebruary 2011. Aiming prudently to not draw down the fund, the government resorted to ¶ limited borrowing to ﬁ nance the deﬁ cit. The government is now planning to avoid using the ¶ reserve fund if oil prices stay at current levels. Any ﬁ nancing needs will be met in part by ¶ borrowing and in part from privatization revenues, though the latter are likely to be limited. ¶ There is a risk that ﬁ scal adjustment on the expenditure side could become slower and the ¶ deﬁ cit could become higher during the election cycle, as well as in the period approaching the ¶ 2014 Olympic Games. Such a scenario would put further pressure on the domestic market, ¶ aggravating the interest rate and creating crowding-out effects. Irrespective of the short-term¶ oil price movements, the government would be well advised to keep the focus of its ﬁ scal ¶ policy on long-term ﬁ scal sustainability, aiming at a more ambitious ﬁ scal adjustment and longterm non-oil ﬁ scal deﬁ cit of about 4.3 percent of GDP (see Russian Economic Report No. 23, ¶ November 2010).

### Civil Disorder

#### High prices result in economic stagnation and civil disorder.

Tsyvinski, Professor @ Yale, 2010

[Aleh and Sergei Guriev, Professor of economics at Yale University, Director of the New Economic School in Moscow, July – August, Russia's "Resource Curse": How High Oil Prices Are Stunting Reforms, http://www.oilandgaseurasia.com/articles/p/123/article/1273/]

Can Russia escape the "resource curse” implied by high oil prices, or will it succumb to what we call a "70-80” scenario? That is the question confronting Russians today, and we fear that their fate will be the latter: if oil prices remain at $70-80 per barrel, Russia is likely to relive key features of the Brezhnev era of the 1970s and 1980s ― with a stagnating economy and 70-80 percent approval ratings for its political leaders.¶ The resource curse means, of course, that Russian elites will prefer to postpone restructuring the economy and modernizing the country’s political and economic institutions. This will undermine economic performance, making it very unlikely that Russia will catch up with the advanced economies in the next 10-15 years, as officials promise.¶ Fast and sustainable economic growth requires the rule of law, accountable, meritocratic, and non-corrupt bureaucrats, protection of property rights, contract enforcement, and competitive markets. Such institutions are difficult to build in every society. In Russia, the task is especially problematic, because the ruling elite’s interests run counter to undertaking it.¶ In post-crisis Russia, the resource curse is reinforced by two factors. First, massive renationalization since 2004 has left state-owned companies once again controlling the commanding heights of the economy. These firms have no interest in developing modern institutions that protect private property and promote the rule of law. ¶ Second, Russia’s high degree of economic inequality sustains the majority’s preference for redistribution rather than private entrepreneurship.¶ Russia’s leaders acknowledge the need for modernization, and pay it frequent lip-service, as is evidenced by President Dmitri Medvedev’s manifesto "Go, Russia!” But the incentives to escape the resource trap are weakened by the overwhelming importance of the resource rents to the wider political elite.¶ When the economy was near collapse during the recent crisis, we thought that the government would recognize the need to push ahead with radical reforms that would eventually lead to a diverse, de-centralized, and fast-growing economy. But, while stimulus policies were mostly effective in dealing with the immediate crisis, they did not address the long-term issues that impede growth.¶ Still, the government continues to tout plans to boost the economy. Vertical industrial policy, horizontal industrial policy, investment in education ― all have been tried in the last 10 years. Yet Russia’s public institutions remain as weak as ever (for example, corruption is as prevalent as it was 10 years ago, if not more so), and the economy is no less dependent on commodity prices.¶ Today’s economic silver bullet is an "innovation city” in Skolkovo, which the government hopes will spur inflows of modern technology. But there are no magic recipes for modernization. Moreover, there is no need to reinvent the wheel. A comprehensive and consistent reform plan was already included in then-President Vladimir Putin’s own economic agenda at the beginning of his first term in 2000.¶ The so-called Gref Program (named after former Minister of the Economy German Gref) foresaw many of the reforms that are vitally needed ― privatization, deregulation, accession to the World Trade Organization, and reform of the government, natural monopolies, and social security. Many of these reforms are outlined in the current government’s own "Long-Term Strategy for 2020.” The problem is that ― as with the Gref program in 2000 ― the Strategy is unlikely to be fully implemented, owing to the same old weak incentives.¶ Even the recently announced privatization of non-controlling stakes in the largest state-owned firms ― while timely and laudable ― will not create an irreversible commitment to reform. So far, the government does not want to let control over these firms get into private hands. Hence, the sales that Prime Minister Putin announced will not increase the demand for pro-market institutions. ¶ By contrast, the "70-80” scenario seems increasingly likely. In June, during the St. Petersburg Economic Forum, participants in two sessions ― Russian government and business leaders, as well as influential foreign players ― were asked about the future of Russia’s economy. The results were drearily similar. ¶ In one session, 61 percent of participants foresaw stagnation in the next 2-5 years (33 percent predicted growth and 5 percent expected a crisis). In the other session, 55 percent of participants foresaw stagnation in the next 10 years (with 41 percent projecting growth and 4 percent expecting collapse).¶ The factors that drove the Putin era of rapid economic growth ― high and rising oil prices, cheap labor, and unused production capacity ― are all exhausted. Russia will thus be forced to start spending the reserves that saved the economy in the recent crisis. ¶ The "70-80” scenario will preserve the status quo, but eventually the economy will reach a dead end, at which point the only choice will be genuine economic reform or decline and dangerous civil disorder.

# AT: Queer Ecology K 2AC

#### Our framework is that the alternative should be judged on the efficacy of its response to existing institutional practices

#### This means that the neg should have to answer the following questions – what is the alternative institution/social order that should be put into place? Is that feasible? What would have to be done to create that change and what would be the consequences of those actions?

#### Absent these questions shifts in knowledge production are useless – governments’ obey institutional logics that exist independently of individuals and constrain decisionmaking – that’s true regardless of this debate

Wight – Professor of IR @ University of Sydney – 6

(Colin, Agents, Structures and International Relations: Politics as Ontology, pgs. 48-50

One important aspect of this relational ontology is that these relations constitute our identity as social actors. According to this relational model of societies, one is what one is, by virtue of the relations within which one is embedded. A worker is only a worker by virtue of his/her relationship to his/her employer and vice versa. ‘Our social being is constituted by relations and our social acts presuppose them.’ At any particular moment in time an individual may be implicated in all manner of relations, each exerting its own peculiar causal effects. This ‘lattice-work’ of relations constitutes the structure of particular societies and endures despite changes in the individuals occupying them. Thus, the relations, the structures, are ontologically distinct from the individuals who enter into them. At a minimum, the social sciences are concerned with two distinct, although mutually interdependent, strata. There is an ontological difference between people and structures: ‘people are not relations, societies are not conscious agents’. Any attempt to explain one in terms of the other should be rejected. If there is an ontological difference between society and people, however, we need to elaborate on the relationship between them. Bhaskar argues that we need a system of mediating concepts, encompassing both aspects of the duality of praxis into which active subjects must fit in order to reproduce it: that is, a system of concepts designating the ‘point of contact’ between human agency and social structures. This is known as a ‘positioned practice’ system. In many respects, the idea of ‘positioned practice’ is very similar to Pierre Bourdieu’s notion of *habitus*. Bourdieu is primarily concerned with what individuals do in their daily lives. He is keen to refute the idea that social activity can be understood solely in terms of individual decision-making, or as determined by surpa-individual objective structures. Bourdieu’s notion of the *habitus* can be viewed as a bridge-building exercise across the explanatory gap between two extremes. Importantly, the notion of a habitus can only be understood in relation to the concept of a ‘social field’. According to Bourdieu, a social field is ‘a network, or a configuration, of objective relations between positions objectively defined’. A social field, then, refers to a structured system of social positions occupied by individuals and/or institutions – the nature of which defines the situation for their occupants. This is a social field whose form is constituted in terms of the relations which define it as a field of a certain type. A *habitus* (positioned practices) is a mediating link between individuals’ subjective worlds and the socio-cultural world into which they are born and which they share with others. The power of the habitus derives from the thoughtlessness of habit and habituation, rather than consciously learned rules. The habitus is imprinted and encoded in a socializing process that commences during early childhood. It is inculcated more by experience than by explicit teaching. Socially competent performances are produced as a matter of routine, without explicit reference to a body of codified knowledge, and without the actors necessarily knowing what they are doing (in the sense of being able adequately to explain what they are doing). As such, the *habitus* can be seen as the site of ‘internalization of reality and the externalization of internality.’ Thus social practices are produced in, and by, the encounter between: (1) the *habitus* and its dispositions; (2) the constraints and demands of the socio-cultural field to which the habitus is appropriate or within; and (3) the dispositions of the individual agents located within both the socio-cultural field and the *habitus*. When placed within Bhaskar’s stratified complex social ontology the model we have is as depicted in Figure 1. The explanation of practices will require all three levels. Society, as field of relations, exists prior to, and is independent of, individual and collective understandings at any particular moment in time; that is, social action requires the conditions for action. Likewise, given that behavior is seemingly recurrent, patterned, ordered, institutionalised, and displays a degree of stability over time, there must be sets of relations and rules that govern it. Contrary to individualist theory, these relations, rules and roles are not dependent upon either knowledge of them by particular individuals, or the existence of actions by particular individuals; that is, their explanation cannot be reduced to consciousness or to the attributes of individuals. These emergent social forms must possess emergent powers. This leads on to arguments for the reality of society based on a causal criterion. Society, as opposed to the individuals that constitute it, is, as Foucault has put it, ‘a complex and independent reality that has its own laws and mechanisms of reaction, its regulations as well as its possibility of disturbance. This new reality is society…It becomes necessary to reflect upon it, upon its specific characteristics, its constants and its variables’.

#### Especialy true for the aff – material structures are engrained

Greta Gaard, assistant professor of composition and women's studies at the University of Minnesota, Duluth, “Living Interconnections with Animals and Nature,” Ecofeminism: Women, Animals, Nature, 1993, p. 2-3

It is now common knowledge that rights-based ethics (most characteristic of dominant-culture men, although women may share this view as well) evolve from a sense of self as separate, existing within a society of individuals who must be protected from each other in competing for scarce resources. In contrast, Gilligan describes a different approach, more common to women, in which "the moral problem arises from conflicting responsibilities rather than from competing rights and requires for its resolution a mode of thinking that is contextual and narrative rather than formal and abstract. This conception of morality as concerned with the activity of care centers moral development around the understanding of responsibility and relationships, just as the conception of morality as fairness ties moral development to the understanding of rights and rules." [4](http://www.questia.com/read/99286383) Similarly, Karen Warren's "Toward an Ecofeminist Ethic" describes eight boundary conditions of a feminist ethic; that is, conditions within which ethical decision making may be seen as feminist. These conditions include coherence within a given historical and conceptual framework, an understanding of feminism as striving to end all systems of oppression, a pluralistic structure, and an inclusive and contextual framework that values and emphasizes humans in relationships, denies abstract individualism, and provides a guide to action. [5](http://www.questia.com/read/99286383) The analyses of Gilligan and Warren indicate that ecofeminism, which asserts the fundamental interconnectedness of all life, offers an appropriate foundation for an ecological ethical theory for women and men who do not operate on the basis of a self/other disjunction. In brief, this psychological -- and political -- construction of the self and the associated ethical system explains why ecofeminists do not find their concerns fully addressed in other branches of the environmental movement. Though some may agree with social ecologists, for example, that the root cause of all oppression is hierarchy, ecofeminists tend to believe hierarchy takes place as a result of the self/other opposition. Ecofeminists' interconnected sense of self requires us to create a theory that will provide, as fully as possible, an inclusive and global analysis of oppression. To do this, theorists must meet with activists to exchange information and to create political strategy; ideally, theorists must also be activists, thereby enacting the goal of ecofeminist praxis. A meeting of theorists and activists concerned about the fate of women and the earth, the World Women's Congress for a Healthy Planet, took place on November 9-12, 1991. In Miami, Florida, over a thousand women from around the world gathered to create a women's action agenda for presentation at the 1992 United Nations Conference on Environment and Development (UNCED). Throughout the conference, a number of topics reappeared which are of concern within ecofeminism. These included population, global economics, Third World debt, the ideology of development, environmental destruction, world hunger, reproductive choice, homelessness, militarism, and political strategies for creating change globally.

#### No link – our aff doesn’t set up environmental standards

#### Rejection of human-centeredness fails – human focus key to solve the environment

Lee, Philosophy Professor at Bloomsburg, ‘9 (Wendy, Spring, “Restoring Human-Centerednes to Environmental Conscience: The Ecocentrist's Dilemma, the Role of Heterosexualized Anthropomorphizing, and the Significance of Language to Ecological Feminism” Ethics and the Environment, Vol 14 No 1, Project Muse)

Acampora and Bender could also object that such an expansion doesn't require a disavowal of self and hence is not necessarily dualistic at all. But this too fails in that (1) the disavowal of the self is central to ecocentric ethics precisely because the self is identified with a centeredness mistakenly coded as chauvinistic by the ecocentrist; the ecocentrist cannot renege here without giving up the very grounds upon which he/she criticizes human-centeredness—however mistaken they may be about it. (2) While they might reject the logic of self/other altogether in favor of some experientially grounded "oneness," this doesn't get us very far. After all, we could no more obviously envision a practicable environmental responsibility following from the pacifism this implies than from the activism Bender and Acampora hope for. Moreover, it simply excludes all of us whose experience does not "achieve" or conform to it. (3) Both Acampora's and Bender's arguments are—denial notwithstanding—implicitly dualistic, and thus inevitably run aground on Cartesian-style shoals for the reasons I've offered. Alternative interpretations of the expansive "I" fare little better—an "I" that appropriates the other into itself is hardly a rejection of chauvinism and a complete dissociation of self faces the problems in (2). The real problem, I think, is that Bender and Acampora simply fail to take seriously enough the meaning of the embodiment or "encapsulation" [End Page 40] to which they themselves appeal—if they did, they would see that human-centeredness is not the enemy of environmental responsibility, but its most vital ally.

#### Perm do both

#### The aff is a giant case turn – have to use uranium and other resources to provide energy, that’s key to check back China

#### Even if security and risk calculation are flawed, engaging in them creates discourse of social welfare and promotes a democratic civic culture that checks political exclusion and loss of value to life

Loader – Criminology Prof at Oxford – 7

(Civilizing Security, Pg. 5)

Faced with such inhospitable conditions, one can easily lapse into fatalistic despair, letting events simply come as they will, or else seek refuge in the consolations offered by the total critique of securitization practices – a path that some critical scholars in criminology and security studies have found all too seductive (e.g. Bigo 2002, 2006; Walters 2003). Or one can, as we have done, supplement social criticism with the hard, uphill, necessarily painstaking work of seeking to specify what it may mean for citizens to live together securely with risk; to think about the social and political arrangements capable of making this possibility more rather than less likely, and to do what one can to nurture practices of collective security shaped not by fugitive market power or by the unfettered actors of (un)civil society, but by an inclusive, democratic politics. Social analysts of crime and security have become highly attuned to, and warned repeatedly of, the illiberal, exclusionary effects of the association between security and political community (Dillon 1996; Hughes 2007). They have not, it should be said, done so without cause, for reasons we set out at some length as the book unfolds. But this sharp sensitivity to the risks of thinking about security through a communitarian lens has itself come at a price, namely, that of failing to address and theorize fully the virtues and social benefits that can flow from members of a political community being able to put and pursue security in common. This, it seems to us, is a failure to heed the implications of the stake that all citizens have in security; to appreciate the closer alignment of self-interest and altruism that can attend the acknowledgement that we are forced to live, as Kant put it, inescapably side-by-side and that individuals simultaneously constitute and threaten one another’s security; and to register the security-enhancing significance and value of the affective bonds of trust and abstract solidarity that political communities depend upon, express and sustain. All this, we think, offers reasons to believe that security offers a conduit, perhaps the best conduit there is, for giving practical meaning to the idea of the public good, for reinventing social democratic politics, even for renewing the activity of politics at all.

#### Turn – the alt causes coal fill-in – that’s 100x worse for the environment – critiques of nuke production are idealistic and treat the energy in a vacuum, not in context

Monbiot ‘11

(George, columnist for The Guardian, has held visiting fellowships or professorships at the universities of Oxford (environmental policy), Bristol (philosophy), Keele (politics), Oxford Brookes (planning), and East London (environmental science), March 21, 2011, “Why Fukushima made me stop worrying and love nuclear power”, http://www.guardian.co.uk/commentisfree/2011/mar/21/pro-nuclear-japan-fukushima)

But the energy source to which most economies will revert if they shut down their nuclear plants is not wood, water, wind or sun, but fossil fuel. On every measure (climate change, mining impact, local pollution, industrial injury and death, even radioactive discharges) coal is 100 times worse than nuclear power. Thanks to the expansion of shale gas production, the impacts of natural gas are catching up fast. Yes, I still loathe the liars who run the nuclear industry. Yes, I would prefer to see the entire sector shut down, if there were harmless alternatives. But there are no ideal solutions. Every energy technology carries a cost; so does the absence of energy technologies. Atomic energy has just been subjected to one of the harshest of possible tests, and the impact on people and the planet has been small. The crisis at Fukushima has converted me to the cause of nuclear power.